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FORTIFYING THE SELF-DEFENSE JUSTIFICATION OF PUNISHMENT
Zac Cogley
zaccogley@gmail.com
Abstract: David Boonin has recently advanced several challenges to the self-defense
justification of punishment. Boonin argues that the self-defense justification of punishment
justifies punishing the innocent, justifies disproportionate punishment, cannot account for
mitigating excuses, and does not justify intentionally harming offenders as we do when we
punish them. In this paper, I argue that the self-defense justification, suitably understood,
can avoid all of these problems. To help demonstrate the self-defense theory’s attraction, I
also develop some contrasts between the self-defense justification, Warren Quinn’s better
known ‘auto-retaliator’ argument, and desert-based justifications of punishment. In sum, I
show that the self-defense justification of punishment is more resilient than commonly
supposed and deserves to be taken seriously as a justification of punishment.
Keywords: punishment; self-defense; desert; retributivism; David Boonin; Phillip Montague;
Daniel Farrell
1 Introduction
My specific aim in what follows is to defend the self-defense justification of
punishment against some recent criticisms by David Boonin.1 But more generally, I want to
use my discussion of Boonin to develop a more compelling self-defense-based account of
the justification of punishment than has yet appeared.2 Boonin’s discussion of the selfdefense solution is careful and clear; he thus provides an excellent articulation of some
putative problems for the self-defense justification of punishment. Despite his concerns,
Boonin notes that, “the self-defense solution is perhaps the most innovative and promising
of the various nonstandard solutions that have been offered to the problem of
punishment”.3 I believe he is correct. I aim to show the self-defense solution is even more
promising than is widely supposed.
I’ll begin by defining punishment and will also briefly discuss why and how it must
be justified. I’ll then give a brief outline of the self-defense theory of punishment’s
1

justification. In the bulk of the paper, I’ll respond to four critiques Boonin makes of the selfdefense theory: that it will justify punishing the innocent, that it justifies disproportionate
punishment, that it can’t account for mitigating excuses (especially in cases of provocation),
and that even if inflicting harms on offenders can be justified via the self-defense theory,
those harms won’t qualify as punishment. Boonin’s discussion thus provides a series of
helpful challenges that, if met successfully, will help me to further develop the self-defense
justification of punishment and defend it.

2 What is Punishment and What Kind of Justification Does it Require?
Punishment, as Boonin and I both define it, is the intentional, authorized infliction
of reprobative, retributive harm on someone. These are conceptual, not normative claims. In
defining punishment, neither Boonin nor I commit to claims about the appropriate
justification of punishment (that the appropriate justification is a retributive one, for
example).
In order to be punishment, the act in question must harm the person in question; if
the act benefitted instead of harmed, we would categorize the act as rewarding, not
punishing. The harm must also be intentionally inflicted—though it may be intentionally
inflicted as a means to some other end, like deterrence.4 Our focus is on legal punishment, so
for the relevant purposes if the relevant act was not performed by an authorized state actor,
that act would not count as punishment. Next, the harm the state actor imposes must be
retributive: the harm must be inflicted in response to the person’s having done a legally
prohibited act. If the state preemptively puts someone in jail in order to prevent her from
speaking at a rally for marijuana legalization, the person’s rights may be violated, but she is
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not punished. Finally, what the state actor does must be reprobative: it must express
condemnation of the person for doing the legally prohibited act.5
This last criterion is required to help mark off the difference between a fine and a fee.
First, of course, a fine is imposed as the result of someone doing something that is legally
prohibited, while a fee is a payment of money in exchange for a good or service. When the
state requires people to pay a fee to renew their drivers licenses, marriage licenses, or
marijuana user cards, the money paid helps to fund the state’s regulation of a permitted
activity. A fine, by contrast, is money that must be paid because someone acted in a way that
is legally prohibited. An additional aspect of the difference between a fine and a fee is that
the fine expresses opprobrium toward the person for doing the act. For example, if someone
is fined for parking in a space reserved for people with disabilities, the fine expresses
condemnation of her for doing so. That does not occur when someone pays the fee to
renew her license plates.
The main philosophical problem presented by legal punishment is determining why
the fact that a person broke the law justifies an authorized agent in intentionally, retributively,
reprobatively harming her. Of course, it might not—which is Boonin’s conclusion. Boonin
claims that there is no satisfactory justification for punishment and that punishment should
be abolished in favor of a system of mandatory restitution.6 Theorists like myself who think
that punishment can, in some circumstances, be justified need to explain when and why it is
permissible to for a state actor to reprobatively harm someone guilty of breaking the law.
Normally, the things we do to people in punishing them—like intentionally harming them by
locking them away from the rest of society—would be wrong. Why would we be justified in
doing those things to someone who broke a law? In the next section, I will briefly sketch
how an analogy with self-defense helps us answer this question.
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3 The Foundation of the Self-Defense Justification of Punishment
Consider what I will call an archetypal case of self-defense: a wrongful, fully-culpable
attacker poses a threat to an innocent victim. Suppose that Kari travels to Colorado for
vacation and then legally purchases some quantity of marijuana. Because Kari will not give
him any of her marijuana stash, Chris attacks Kari. Most would agree that in such a situation
Kari may act to ward off Chris’s attack and that—if harming Chris is the only way to prevent
herself from being harmed by his attack—Kari is permitted to harm Chris. Why is Kari
permitted to harm Chris, or even kill him if he poses a lethal threat to her, if doing so is
necessary to saving her own life? After all, normally we are not permitted to harm or kill
others!
The most plausible explanation of Kari’s right of self-defense invokes a principle of
distributive justice:
DJ: if it is inevitable that either A or B will be harmed, and if A’s wrongful
conduct is the reason it is inevitable that someone will be harmed, then
justice permits acting so that A is harmed rather than B (so long as the harm
that B suffers is not disproportionate to the harm that A would have
suffered).7
Note that DJ does not justify Kari harming Chris unless she must do so to defend herself.
Suppose Kari can either harm Chris or she can blow marijuana smoke in his face to confuse
him and then escape. Then it is not inevitable that someone will be harmed, so the principle
does not justify her harming him—call this the ‘necessity’ restriction. Importantly, DJ also
applies to the actions of third parties. Suppose that Chris attacks Kari and she has no way to
defend herself. However, Tony can harm Chris and thereby prevent harm to Kari. The
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principle permits Tony to intervene on Kari’s behalf and harm Chris to prevent him from
harming Kari. Finally, the principle requires that the harm imposed on Chris to defend Kari
not be disproportionate to the harm Kari would have suffered—call this the ‘proportionality
restriction.’ Thus, Chris may not be killed to prevent him from flicking Kari’s ear.
While the principle justifies Kari harming Chris in self-defense, the reason is not that
Chris deserves to be harmed or that it is good for him to be harmed (even granting these
claims might be true).8 The moral basis of DJ is justice: the proper distribution of benefits
and burdens between individuals. One way to make out this claim might be in a Rawlsian
manner.9 People in an fair bargaining position choosing principles of justice to govern each
other’s behavior would choose a principle of justice that distributes harm to A rather than B.
In other words, this is simply the distribution of benefits and burdens rational people would
prefer when choosing from behind the veil of ignorance.10
Space does not permit me to further explore the moral basis of DJ or to discuss
arguments in defense of it. (There is a rich literature on the justifiability of self-defense and
on self-defensive killing in war.)11 Therefore, I will simply assume, in what follows, that DJ
offers the correct explanation of why and when an innocent like Kari would be justified in
harming someone like Chris to prevent his wrongful attack.12 Our question of interest, now,
is how to extend this principle from the case of self-defense—where a harm will imminently
occur unless defensive action is taken—to the case of punishment, where it would seem the
harm done by the law-breaker has already occurred.
Multiple ways of applying DJ to punishment have been suggested. One begins from
the observation that, as noted above, DJ allows for other-defense; it permits another party, C,
to act so that A is harmed rather than B. And, as Phillip Montague suggests, the state can be
a general instance of C: either the state enacts a system of punishment, or it doesn’t.13 If the

5

state doesn’t create and enforce a system of punishment, innocents will be harmed. If the
state does create a system of punishment that has some deterrent value, some innocents will
be spared from harm and instead some of those who persist in engaging in wrongful
conduct will be harmed. No matter what the state does, then, some people will be harmed;
the question is whether it will be innocent or wrongful parties. Justice permits the state using
punishment to distribute harm away from innocent parties and onto parties who are
responsible for wrongful harms.14
Another way to apply DJ to the case of state punishment emphasizes that even in
individual self-defense cases there may be future harms made more likely by a past attack 15.
For example, suppose that Chris has successfully attacked Kari and stolen some of her
marijuana. That fact might embolden some other unsavory vacationers to try to attack Kari
in order to get some of the rest of her marijuana. “If Chris got away with it,” they might
reason, “no reason to think I won’t!” Chris’s attack thus might increase the probability of
other harms to Kari in the future. Increased risk of harm is, itself, plausibly construed as a
kind of harm.1617 Some of these future harms to Kari may be conditional on whether or not
she harms Chris in retaliation for his attack, or not. Some reprobate vacationers may be
deterred from attacking Kari if they know that she successfully retaliated against Chris. So it
may also be true that Kari’s harming Chris after he has already attacked will prevent future
harm to her. Again, DJ also allows for third parties to act to defend innocents against
suffering harm at the hands of culpable attackers. So Tony might justifiably harm Chris, if
doing so will eliminate risks to Kari that have been increased by Chris’s attack (and the harm
Tony imposes on Chris is proportionate to the risk of harm Kari would otherwise suffer).
These observations also support the application of DJ to the case of criminal
punishment. Besides the direct harm to victims already caused by the actions of those who
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break the law, other future harms are caused or made more likely by the actions of
lawbreakers. For example, victims and those connected to them might appropriately fear a
future attack by the offender, conditional on whether the offender is punished. The
offender’s attack may also reduce the overall level of security in a community, again
conditional on whether or not the offender is punished.18 In punishing an offender, the state
certainly cannot prevent all harms which the offender’s actions have already caused.
However, some future harms are plausibly conditional on whether the offender is punished;
the state may then be able to eliminate or mitigate these harms by punishing the offender. If
so, the self-defense principle (DJ) will justify the state punishing the offender if the harms
imposed on the offender are not disproportionate to the harms avoided.
Before continuing to Boonin’s challenges, let me briefly distinguish the self-defense
justification of punishment from Warren Quinn’s ‘auto-retaliator’ justification.19 At a great
enough level of abstraction, Quinn’s strategy shares a common structure with the selfdefense justification. Quinn also attempts to justify punishment via analogy to an otherwise
permissible activity. Quinn argues that we have the right to threaten to punish people for
breaking the law by arguing that we would have the right to use ‘auto-retaliator’ devices that
would mechanically identify and punish those who break the law. Quinn argues that the use
of such devices is morally equivalent to setting up a system of punishment and that the use
of such devices would be justified. If so, setting up a system of punishment would also be
justified.
While Quinn’s proposal has received much attention, his auto-retaliator devices are
not analogous to punishment. Consider that once the device is ‘programmed’ and someone
breaks the law, there is no further choice about whether or not to inflict harm. The devices
automatically impose harm in such cases. As Quinn admits20 and Boonin notes21, this means
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that the harm imposed by the devices is merely foreseen—not intended—by those who
deploy them. Since punishment is intentionally imposed on offenders, Quinn’s devices are
not directly analogous to punishment. In self-defense cases, by contrast, someone must
choose whether or not to impose the relevant defensive harms, just as when we punish we
must choose whether or not to harm someone who has already broken the law.22

4 Boonin’s Challenges
4.1 Punishing the Innocent
Boonin’s first objection is that the self-defense theory justifies punishing innocent
people. If he is correct, and punishing the innocent is morally unacceptable, then the selfdefense theory has implications that mean it must be rejected. Boonin suggests that the
choice the state faces regarding whether and how to punish may be more complicated than
initially suggested.
Suppose the state has these options:
(1) Do nothing in response to violations of the law; if so, many innocent
people will be harmed.
(2) Threaten to harm and harm only people who violate the law; in which
case some people will be deterred from breaking the law and some
innocents will be spared from harm.
(3) Threaten to harm and harm people who violate the law as well as their
children; if so, even more people will be deterred from breaking the law
and so even more innocents will be spared from harm.
Boonin supposes that option (3) has the following implication: “for every one
innocent child who will end up being harmed as a result [of punishing the children of
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offenders], five other innocent people (maybe even innocent children) will be saved from
being victimized by offenders in the first place.”23 Plausibly, if punishment has some
deterrent value, threatening to harm and harming both the children of offenders and
offenders will have more deterrent effect than only threatening to harm and harming
offenders. If this is so, Boonin urges, the self-defense theory will imply that the state should
do everything it can to shift harm onto the guilty so the innocent avoid harm. Thus, the selfdefense theory implies that the state should punish innocent people.
In responding to Boonin, it may be helpful to first briefly return to the moral basis
of the principle of self-defense (DJ), above. DJ allows that someone can permissibly be
harmed if that person’s culpable action results in a situation where either an innocent person
will be harmed or, alternatively, the culpable person is harmed. The DJ principle does not
make claims about the overall goodness of states of affairs where the guilty suffer rather than
the innocent—it is not a principle of desert. Instead, DJ makes the more claim that, if harm
is inevitable, then it fair for harm to be shifted onto those who are guilty for making that harm
inevitable in order to avoid harm to those who are innocent with respect to that very harm.
The DJ principle’s clearest import is thus for situations where the specific harms that
would result for innocents through the culpable actions of a person or persons can be
avoided by harming those very culpable actors in response. Deirdre Golash makes this point
with the following observation: “If Charles Manson’s cellmate threatens my life, I may not
kill Manson to distract him; and if I, with my near-perfect moral character, threaten Manson
at gunpoint, he is justified in defending himself, regardless of his past crimes.”24 Golash’s
perspicuous example helps to show that—contra the overstatement of some self-defense
theorists25—DJ does not embody an overall ideal of ‘cosmic justice’ where the world is more
just if people with good characters get good things and less just if people with poor
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characters do well. Perhaps such claims are true, but DJ is a more limited principle that takes
no stand on them.26
An advocate of DJ’s extension to punishment, like myself, should thus insist that the
move from situation (2), where only the guilty are harmed, to (3), where some innocents are
harmed in order to avoid additional harms to other innocents, does not involve an
application of the DJ principle at all. This can be seen by a more careful examination of the
cases Boonin presents. Suppose, first, that the state does exactly, and only, what (2) suggests.
Note that it is possible that the total aggregate harm to people in situation (1) might be
exactly the same as that in situation (2). But DJ implies that situation (2) may permissibly be
selected, because it is fair that harm falls on those culpable for the harm, rather than those
not culpable for the harm. So the state is allowed to choose (2) over (1) because of
considerations of justice, not because of considerations concerning reducing the aggregate
level of harm in society. It might be even better if aggregate harm were reduced, but DJ only
justifies acting to reduce aggregate harm if harm is imposed on those culpable for its
inevitability and is not disproportionate.
So imagine that the state has enacted situation (2). Now an enterprising bureaucrat
points out that the state can use the same mechanism set up for approximating fairness for a
very different end: decreasing aggregate harm to innocents. This is the situation Boonin
describes in (3). While the state would be using the system of punishment previously
employed only in the service of justice, the state is now considering employing that system
for a different end: roughly speaking, keeping more of those citizens who are undeserving of
harm from suffering it. The state would thus no longer be only doing something justified by
DJ: treating offenders harshly to prevent harms that would otherwise have resulted from the
offenders’ actions. Instead the state would additionally begin doing something DJ does not
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address: using harsh treatment of offenders to make a greater number of innocent people
better off than they otherwise would have been.
Step away from this discussion for a moment to consider the charge that because the
self-defense theory implies that Kari’s use of a gun in self-defense against Chris is justified,
the self-defense theory also justifies Kari’s use of a gun to enact a Robin Hood-like scheme.
(Kari’s Robin Hood-like use of the gun involves threatening callous and unpleasant, but
rightful, owners of marijuana in order to take their weed and give it to more agreeable potsmokers.) The fact that DJ implies using a gun in self-defense can be justified does not have
clear implications for whether using a gun for other very different (and perhaps even morally
laudatory) aims is also justified. Similarly, the fact that punishment can be justified when
employed for self-defense in a way that more justly distributes harm does not imply that
using punishment for other aims is also justified—even if how punishment is deployed in
those cases affects the distribution of harms.27 Therefore, I conclude the self-defense theory
does not justify punishing the innocent. It avoids Boonin’s first problem.

4.2 Disproportionate Punishment
Boonin’s second challenge for the self-defense theory is that it will justify
punishments that are disproportionate to the severity of the offense. Boonin advances the
challenge in two ways. He first develops the claim that in some cases the self-defense theory
justifies severe punishment for minor offenses; in others, the self-defense theory does not
justify punishing major offenses severely enough.
Let’s first focus on the claim that the self-defense theory justifies too much
punishment for some offenses. The initial argument for this claim is due to Larry
Alexander,28 who believes that the distributive justice principle (DJ) should not incorporate a
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proportionality restriction: the stipulation that defensive harm must not be out of proportion
with the harm threatened by a culpable attacker. His argument against the inclusion of the
proportionality restriction begins with the observation that in order to prevent the theft of
his rose bushes he would be justified in moving them to a private island surrounded by
sharks, so long as the threat is made clear to potential thieves. If this is so, Alexander urges,
he would also be justified in constructing a shark-filled moat to protect the rose bushes. And
thus, Boonin concludes,
if it is permissible to build a lethal moat to protect one’s roses, then, according to the
argument that attempts to justify the self-defense solution, it must be permissible to
threaten lethal consequences for sealing roses and, finally, to inflict those
consequences on those who steal them.29
Thus, Boonin claims that the self-defense theory justifies the death penalty for minor
infractions like rose theft.
The self-defense theorist should point out that these cases are not close analogies.
There are a number of differences that may be morally relevant. Moving the roses to a
private island takes advantage of a naturally and already occurring hazard, while building a
lethal moat brings into existence a new and artificial one. The building of the moat also
occurs on private property and, in order to be subject to the threat, a person must trespass
on that property. The mere fact that death is being threatened for the same act in all the
cases is not enough to show that building a shark-filled moat to prevent rose-stealing is
relevantly analogous to the state’s painfully executing someone for the same act. If the threat
is made clear, it is easier for people to avoid being subject to an unpleasant shark death in
the moat than if the state decides to institute shark death for stealing roses. Most important
for our purposes is that a person who builds a shark-filled moat does not face the choice of
whether to impose harm after they have made the decision to threaten harm—as is the case
with both self-defense and punishment. Alexander’s case is most directly analogous to
12

Quinn’s auto-retaliator machine, and is thus not a case of self-defense. The more direct
analogy to self-defense would be that Alexander builds the moat to protect his roses, sees a
would-be rose stealer crossing the bridge, and then—realizing there is no other way to
protect the roses—must consider whether to push the miscreant into the shark-filled moat.
While self-defense theorists may concur with Alexander that he is justified in initially
building his moat, they should deny that he is justified in pushing the would-be thief to a
sharky doom because it violates the proportionality restriction. The argument against DJ’s
proportionality restriction based on the putative similarity of these cases should thus be
rejected; the self-defense theory does not justify too much punishment.
Boonin’s second proportionality challenge concerns the opposite claim: that in some
situations the self-defense theory justifies too little punishment. Boonin develops this
critique by considering the crime of arson. Suppose that a $500 file would deter almost
everyone from committing arson. However, a small number of people are not deterred by
this fine; the only punishment that would deter them is death or intense torture. Since the
harm of intense torture is disproportionate to the harm of arson, the self-defense theory will
not allow the state to impose it. Further, as Boonin correctly observes, the self-defense
theory also implies that increasing the fine to $1000 is unjustified, for the $1000 fine
provides no protection that is not already secured by the $500 fine. If this is so, Boonin
charges the self-defense view with justifying only what many people will find to be “an
unacceptably light sentence.”30 For the following reasons, self-defense theorists should be
comfortable with this result.
The first relevant point is that any theory of punishment will be revisionary in the
sense that it will be committed to results that some number of people will find intuitively
jarring. While Boonin himself rejects the permissibility of punishment, his preferred
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alternative—the theory of pure restitution—has intuitive implications that many people will
find implausible, at least on first look.31 So the mere fact that in one instance many people
find the implications of the self-defense theory to be intuitively suspect is not a compelling
reason to reject the theory unless the intuitions can be justified in a way that casts doubt on
the theory, itself.
Second, the clearest way to ground the intuition that people who commit arson
should be punished with a $1000 fine even if a $500 fine provides equivalent deterrent effect
is to claim that people who commit arson deserve to suffer more harm than simply a $500 fine.
Again, however, the core principle of the self-defense view concerns fairness and the just
distribution of harm; it is not a desert-based (or retributive) view.32 The self-defense theory
rejects appeals to desert to justify punishment and applauds the limits on punishment her
account imposes. The self-defense view allows punishment of offenders only when the harm
imposed on offenders is necessary to avoid harms that would have been suffered by
innocents had the punishment not occurred.33
To further see the distinction between desert and justice justifications, consider how
to understand the normative force of a desert claim versus a claim based on principles
articulating just self-defense. Part of the attraction of the self-defense view is the idea that,
considered from the standpoint of justice, the arsonist’s interests still count in the sense that
it wouldn’t be better to harm her unless doing so allowed us to avoid some other harms for
which she is responsible. By contrast, we can understand the claim that the arsonist deserves
to be punished by saying it would be intrinsically good if she were punished34 or, perhaps,
that it is better that she be punished than not be punished.35 Note that in either case, the
desert theorist is making a value claim that holds independently of any effects that punishing
the arsonist might have. Minimally, the desert theorist thus says that the world would be a
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better place—other thing equal—if the arsonist is punished even if no other goods come of
it. The self-defense theory, by contrast, does not imply that punishment can be justified if it
only serves to harm the offender.
Finally, consider that sometimes the empirical facts do not allow us to do what we
would be morally permitted to do, were the facts different (as Boonin notes in another
context). For example, if there were a willing donor we would be able to do a life-saving
transplant. But since there isn’t a willing donor we have no morally permissible way to save
the patient’s life.36 Similarly, if a $1000 fine did provide more deterrent effect for arson, we
would be permitted to levy that punishment on arsonists. But that is not the case here since,
by hypothesis, the $1000 fine is equivalent in deterrent effect to the $500 fine. This case
simply helps to demonstrate that “when offenders violate the law, it is not always permissible
for the state to do everything that it would be morally permitted to do in response [were the
facts different].”37 For all these reasons, the self-defense theorist should be comfortable that
her theory only justifies what some think is too light a sentence. Therefore, the self-defense
theory can adequately respond to Boonin’s second critique.

4.3 Mitigating Excuses
The third problem that Boonin presents for the self-defense theory also concerns the
proportionality of punishment. It is common for the law to recognize provocation as a
mitigating excuse, so that a person who attacks another after being provoked will typically
not be subject to as much punishment as a person who attacks another without being
provoked. Boonin charges that the self-defense theory will have very counter-intuitive
results: he claims it will imply punishing provoked people more than unprovoked people!38
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Boonin’s argument here rest on the plausible empirical claim that a greater level of
harm will have to be threatened in order to prevent a provoked attacker than an unprovoked
attacker. That idea is that people who are provoked ‘lose their cool’ in a way that makes
them less likely to dispassionately consider potential costs and benefits of potential courses
of action. Suppose, then, that given what punishments we have a right to threaten and
impose, fining people $1000 for unprovoked assault is maximally permissibly deterrent.
(Punishing assault with painful death would give us more deterrent value, but imposing a
painful death is disproportionate to the harm suffered by potential innocent assault victims.)
Suppose, further, that the maximally deterrent permissible punishment for provoked assault
we have a right to threaten and impose is a $2000 fine. Then we are justified in imposing—
and justice allows imposing—a greater fine for provoked assault than unprovoked assault.
To many, this will intuitively seem like it gets the proportionality wrong. Provoked assault
should be punished less severely than unprovoked assault.39
Now, one response for the self-defense theorist would be to emphasize the point
that ended our discussion of the 2nd objection. Namely, the facts may conspire to prevent (or
allow) us to do what we would not be justified in doing, were the facts different. For
example, suppose we could permissibly impose a $10,000 fine for either provoked or
unprovoked assault because that amount not disproportionate to the harm that would be
otherwise be suffered by assault victims. If a $10,000 fine has significant deterrent value then
equal fines of $10,000 are justified, even if it seems intuitively surprising to punish provoked
and unprovoked assault equally.
This is a less satisfying response than it was in the discussion of arson, above. This is
because the unintuitive nature of punishing provoked attacks more severely than
unprovoked attacks can be developed in another way that puts significantly more pressure
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on the self-defense theory. That is to note that punishing provoked assaults more severely
than unprovoked assaults is unfair, given the commitments of the self-defense theory. The
self-defense theory emphasizes culpability to explain why innocent victims may be
permissibly defended by imposing harms on their attackers. Someone who attacks without
provocation is more culpable for the attack than someone who is provoked into doing so.
Therefore, the problem presented by punishing provoked attacks more severely is more
difficult than the above problem illustrated by the discussion of arson.
While this presentation of the problem is more serious, the self-defense theory has a
solution. The self-defense theory can emphasize the very same points that Boonin does
when discussing the presumptive difficulty presented by mitigating excuses for his own
theory of pure restitution.40 First, the self-defense theory can emphasize that the total
amount of harm produced by unprovoked attacks is greater than that produced by provoked
attacks. Physical and financial harms are likely identical for victims of assault regardless
whether they provoked the assault or not, but the psychological suffering caused by an
unprovoked attack is probably greater. More significantly, the secondary effects on other
victims are greater in the case of unprovoked attacks. A person who engages in unprovoked
attacks poses a greater threat to the objective security of other people in the community than
does a person who only attacks when provoked.41 Given that fact, the self-defense theory
will imply that the state is entitled to punish unprovoked attackers more severely, since more
harm can be avoided by punishing them than can be avoided by punishing provoked
attackers.
The second—and related—way the self-defense theory can respond to Boonin’s final
challenge is to emphasize the moral salience of being fully, as opposed to partially,
responsible for a harm. (This is a natural extension of the self-defense theory’s emphasis on
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culpability.) As Boonin notes, if there is merit to the judgment that the provoked attacker
should be punished less than the unprovoked attacker, that is presumably because the
provoked attacker is less responsible for his actions than is the unprovoked attacker. And, if
the provoked attacker is less responsible for his actions he is less responsible for the results
of them, including the harms caused to innocent victims and the rest of society.
To see the relevance of this point, imagine a case where someone intentionally and
maliciously throws two rocks toward you.42 You have a shield which you can use to deflect
both rocks back onto your attacker, thereby harming him instead of you. You can also
deflect just one rock, or allow yourself to be hit by both. DJ justifies deflecting both rocks so
your attacker is harmed by both rocks. Now imagine someone who is simply careless in
throwing the two rocks. Just like before, you can either deflect both rocks, only one, or allow
yourself to be hit by both. Additionally, suppose that the careless person is only 50%
responsible for the potential harm to you. Then, DJ’s proportionality restriction, which says
that justice permits acting so that the culpable party suffers harm so long as the harm that
the culpable party suffers isn’t disproportionate to the harm the innocent party would
otherwise suffer, permits you only to deflect one rock. Just because you are threatened by
two rocks doesn’t mean you can deflect both. Since the careless person is only responsible
for the amount of harm that would be caused by one rock, you are only justified in
deflecting back that amount of harm.43
Now return to provoked attackers. Suppose that a representative provoked attacker
is only 50% responsible for the harm he threatens, while a representative unprovoked
attacker is 100% responsible for the harm threatened by his attack. Then, the self-defense
theory will allow punishing the provoked attacker only 50% as severely. The smaller amount
of harm for which provoked attackers are culpable means that it would only be
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proportionate to impose a lesser amount of harm in response to what they do. Thus, the
self-defense theory has two broad explanations of why we would be justified in punishing
provoked attacks less severely than unprovoked attacks, both of which flow from the
theory’s emphasis on offenders’ culpability for harms.

4.4 Harm vs Punishment
The final objection Boonin levies against the self-defense theory is that it does not
justify harming offenders intentionally and reprobatively.44 If these are essential elements of
punishment—as both he and I accept—then the self-defense theory might justify a practice
that superficially appears to be punishment, but isn’t. Boonin presents the following case to
demonstrate the problem. Suppose that I wrongfully throw a rock at you. Luckily, you’re
holding a shield which you can use to deflect the rock back onto me (causing roughly the
same amount of harm as you would have otherwise suffered). So either you allow yourself to
be hit by the rock or you deflect it back onto me. The principle of justice, DJ, would permit
you to deflect it. But if you deflect the rock, the harm to me will be merely foreseen, not
intended. Additionally, deflecting the rock doesn’t seem to express disapproval of my act in
any way—it would not be reprobative like punishment. If so, the practice DJ justifies might
be a practice more analogous to one where harms are only imposed foreseeably and no
condemnation is expressed. The practice justified by the self-defense theory would be more
akin to quarantine45 than punishment.
First, let me show that the self-defense theory of punishment can justify intentionally
harming offenders. We need to be clear that in claiming that we punish intentionally the
claim is not that punishment necessarily harms offenders for its own sake. For a harm to be
intentional, it’s sufficient that the harm be intended as a means to some other end. For
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example, a parent punishes a child by spanking even if the parent’s ultimate aim is to deter
the child from doing the act again.46 That is because the parent has “chosen pain as a means
to achieve her end, even if…she would prefer not to.”47 By contrast, when you defend
yourself by deflecting my rock with your shield you have not chosen pain as your means.
The means of your defensive action is your use of the shield. But in many cases addressed by
DJ, intentional harm occurs. For example, in what we might call ‘direct self-defense cases,’
you prevent your own death by intentionally killing your assailant. In other cases covered by
DJ, you chose pain as a means to your ends. For example, suppose you have already been
attacked and injured by a wrongdoer. You can tell that, unless you do something unpleasant
to your attacker—thereby ‘making an example’ of him—other potential attackers will be
emboldened and will attack you. Supposing that the pain you cause to your already
successful attacker is not disproportionate to the pain you avoid by making an example of
him, DJ justifies intentionally harming him.
The self-defense theory can avail itself of these resources in explaining why
punishment justified by DJ counts as intentional. When the state decides to punish, it has
chosen pain as a means to its ends. As I’ve noted, one end the state might have in mind is
deterring future offenders. There are other ways to deter than using punishment—we could
put up signs warning potential offenders that they are being watched, for example. That
wouldn’t involve intentionally inflicting harm. But if, for example, what we’re going to do to
offenders is lock them away so they have little social and human contact with the hope that
the badness of that situation will lead them and others to make different choices, we’ve
chosen a harmful route to our end. This contrasts with quarantine, where we might lock
people away with the hope that a disease will be stopped or crime will decrease because we
decrease the amount of social interaction between people. Quarantines work just as well if
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the accommodations aren’t onerous. Thus, it need not be part of our aim that quarantine is
bad for those confined. When the state chooses deterrence, by contrast, it chooses a harmful
method of achieving its goals.
Let me now consider Boonin’s second concern. How can the harms DJ justifies
express condemnation, when you don’t convey disapproval of my rock-throwing by
deflecting the rock toward me? To see the worry, recall the comparison with quarantine.
Locking people away to prevent disease doesn’t denounce. Punishment does denunciate, so
we need to understand how DJ can justify harms that also convey condemnation. Here the
self-defense theorist should emphasize that a practice of institutional punishment justified by
DJ will still have the elements that make punishment express censure. For example, the selfdefense theorist should urge the state to continue the practice of publishing a list of acts the
state considers wrong and that punishment only be imposed if, at the end of a trial, the
offender is found guilty of having committed one of those acts. When, after a finding of
guilt, the state intentionally harms someone who did something they had no right to do, the
state’s act will express condemnation—no matter the justification for the state’s action. The
self-defense theory can therefore justify the intentional, reprobative harms that are
distinctive of punishment.48

5 Conclusion
I’ve here defended the self-defense theory of punishment’s justification against four
recent challenges presented by David Boonin. The self-defense theory does not imply that
we should punish the innocent, does not endorse disproportionate punishment, does not fail
to accommodate a mitigating excuse for provocation, and does not fail to justify punishment. I
said at the outset that my main aim in the paper is to show that the self-defense theory does
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not have these problematic commitments. I have also tried to show how strong the selfdefense theory is, quite apart from Boonin’s criticisms. To help show the theory’s
attractiveness, I also distinguished the self-defense theory’s commitments from alternative
theories of punishment’s justification that are sometimes conflated with it, like desert-based
and Quinn-inspired accounts. I believe that the self-defense theory is the most plausible
theory of punishment’s justification on offer, while at the same time being perhaps one of
the most underappreciated. My larger hope is that this paper leads to recognition of the
merits of a suitably articulated self-defense justification of punishment.
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1

The Problem of Punishment.
Surprisingly—to this author, at least—the self-defense solution is often overlooked in the
literature on punishment. To take one example, in his recent book, Punishment, Thom Brooks
2

22

neither mentions the self-defense justification of punishment nor cites any of the theorists
who defend it. I have in mind work by Quinn, “The Right to Threaten and the Right to
Punish”; Farrell, “The Justification of General Deterrence”; Farrell, “Punishment Without
The State”; Farrell, “The Justification of Deterrent Violence”; Farrell, “Deterrence and the
Just Distribution of Harm”; Cederblom, “The Retributive Liability Theory of Punishment”;
Montague, Punishment as Societal Defense; Montague, “Recent Approaches to Justifying
Punishment”; Kelly, “Criminal Justice Without Retribution”; Kelly, “Desert and Fairness in
Criminal Justice.” Boonin’s attentive discussion of the self-defense justification is thus
welcome. My hope is that this paper bolsters the case for taking it seriously.
A notable exception to this pattern is Victor Tadros’ The Ends of Harm. There Tadros
attempts to ground state punishment via a series of duties that wrongdoers incur as the
result of their conduct. For example, Tadros implicitly accepts that as the result of wrongful
conduct a person incurs a duty make an agreement with others who also pose risks of
wrongful harm in order find someone to avert threats of harm for which she is responsible.
Additionally, Tadros accepts that people then have duties to act on such agreements. Finally,
Tadros accepts that third parties have the right to force the self-sacrifice involved in such an
agreement even if the agreement isn’t made Tadros, “Answers,” 74–79.
Tadros attempts to ground these duties in a discussion of cases of self-defense The
Ends of Harm, 169–264. But, as will become clear below, appealing to such duties is a major
departure from how I appeal to self-defense in justifying punishment. For additional
discussion of Tadros’ account see the symposium on his book in Criminal Law and Philosophy
(2015), especially Farrell, “Using Wrongdoers Rightly.” In this paper, I directly demonstrate
the resilience of the self-defense theory against Boonin’s critiques.
3
The Problem of Punishment, 198.
4
Ibid., 14.
5
Feinberg, “The Expressive Function of Punishment.”
6
The Problem of Punishment, 213–75.
7
Similar principles are invoked by Montague, “Self-Defense and Choosing between Lives”;
Montague, Punishment as Societal Defense; Montague, “Recent Approaches to Justifying
Punishment”; Farrell, “The Justification of General Deterrence”; Farrell, “Punishment
Without The State”; Farrell, “The Justification of Deterrent Violence”; Farrell, “Deterrence
and the Just Distribution of Harm”; Cederblom, “The Retributive Liability Theory of
Punishment”; Kelly, “Criminal Justice Without Retribution”; Kelly, “Desert and Fairness in
Criminal Justice.” Boonin’s statement of the principle omits the proportionality restriction
invoked by several of the authors Montague, Punishment as Societal Defense, 45–46; Farrell,
“The Justification of Deterrent Violence,” 302–3. Boonin’s version of the principle is “if
there is a situation in which it is inevitable that either A or B will be harmed, and if this
situation is A’s fault, then it is just to distribute the harm to A rather than to B” The Problem of
Punishment, 196. I discuss proportionality in section 4.2.
8
I further discuss the distinction between the self-defense justification and a desert-based
justification in Section 4.2.
9
Rawls restricts his theory’s application to an ideal society with no need of punishment: A
Theory of Justice, 8. However, this is a theoretical starting point; there is no in principle reason
why the theory cannot be further extended.
10
For a related line of thought, see Kelly, “Criminal Justice Without Retribution”; Kelly,
“Desert and Fairness in Criminal Justice.”
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11

Interested readers would do well to consult Jeff McMahan’s work, especially his book
Killing in War.
12
Boonin appears to accept this assumption as well: The Problem of Punishment, 196.
13
“Recent Approaches to Justifying Punishment,” 25–26.
14
Montague, Punishment as Societal Defense, 62–64; Cederblom, “The Retributive Liability
Theory of Punishment,” 307; Boonin, The Problem of Punishment, 196–97.
15
Farrell, “Punishment Without The State,” 444.
16
Boonin, The Problem of Punishment, 251–53.
17
Note that in individual self-defense cases the wrongful attacker may only be culpable for
having increased the likelihood that the innocent party will be harmed. Thus, in such cases
the innocent part is justified in actually harming the other, even though the other has only
increased the risk of harm to the innocent.
18
Boonin, The Problem of Punishment, 241.
19
“The Right to Threaten and the Right to Punish.”
20
Ibid., 339–41.
21
The Problem of Punishment, 206–7.
22
Space does not permit a more detailed investigation of the difficulties that beset Quinn’s
attempt to justify punishment. In Section 4.2, I allude to other contrasts between with the
self-defense justification and Quinn’s theoretical framework. For more discussion, see Farrell,
“The Justification of Deterrent Violence,” 307–11; Boonin, The Problem of Punishment, 194–
207.
23
The Problem of Punishment, 201.
24
The Case Against Punishment, 98.
25
Montague, Punishment as Societal Defense, 47; Cederblom, “The Retributive Liability Theory
of Punishment,” 307.
26
Additionally, the cosmic justice claim is not intuitively plausible as stated. Perhaps some of
those with good characters were lucky to have upbringings that make it easy for them to act
morally and some of those with bad characters try far harder to do the right thing. Such
intricacies may complicate attempts to link just treatment with desert, but are not a problem
for the self-defense theory, properly articulated. See Kelly, “Criminal Justice Without
Retribution”; Kelly, “Desert and Fairness in Criminal Justice.”
27
Essentially, I am urging that the self-defense theory has more restricted application than
Boonin demands. In a footnote, he anticipates this response and in reply claims that a
defender of the self-defense theory cannot avoid endorsing using punishment as suggested
in situation (3) because there are cases where virtually everyone agrees that it is justified to
act to shift harm onto smaller numbers of innocents to avoid harm to larger numbers, as in
the trolley problem: The Problem of Punishment, 201. But it is too much to ask of the selfdefense theory, which concerns the proper use of defensive force by innocents against
potential harms for which some people are culpable, to be a theory of the justifiable use of
all force. There may be other cases in which the use of force is justified. But if those cases
involve shifting harms no one is culpable for from some innocents onto other innocents—as
in the trolley problem or in my last hypothetical—they are not within the scope of the selfdefense theory.
28
“Self-Defense, Punishment, and Proportionality.”
29
The Problem of Punishment, 202.
30
Ibid., 203.
31
Ibid., 218–75.
24

32

Boonin argues at length against the idea that desert-based retributivism provides adequate
justification for punishment, so it is surprising to find him appealing to intuitions he doesn’t
find to have significant probative force. See Ibid., 87–103.
33
The arson case is thus actually a putative threat to DJ’s ‘necessity’ restriction rather than
the ‘proportionality’ constraint.
34
Davis, “They Deserve to Suffer”; Moore, “Justifying Retributivism.”; Hurka, “The
Common Structure of Virtue and Desert”; Berman, “Punishment and Justification.”
35
Berman, “Rehabilitating Retributivism.”
36
The Problem of Punishment, 235–36.
37
Ibid., 236.
38
Strictly speaking, Boonin’s claim is that the self-defense theory has two options: treat all
cases of assault equally, or treat provoked and unprovoked cases differently. He argues that
if self-defense theorists go with the first option they will be committed to the unintuitive
idea that we should punish provoked and unprovoked offenses equally. I agree with him; the
only plausible response for the self-defense theory is to distinguish provoked and
unprovoked defenses, so that is the response I develop.
39
The intuition that a $2000 fine is deserved or undeserved is given no role in the selfdefense theory. So much the worse for that intuition, from the perspective of the selfdefense theorist.
40
Boonin, The Problem of Punishment, 256–59.
41
All three of these are plausible, but ultimately empirical, claims.
42
This case is due to Boonin (personal communication).
43
Compare a situation where you are threatened by two rocks: one thrown by a malicious
person and another that simply falls through natural causes. DJ only permits you to deflect
the thrown rock toward the malicious person.
44
In The Problem of Punishment, Boonin focuses only on the first problem: harming offenders
intentionally The Problem of Punishment, 205–7. He raises the second problem in personal
communication.
45
Ibid., 22.
46
Ibid., 14.
47
Ibid., 14, fn 15.
48
In response to the same concern—that his own theory of pure restitution will not allow
the state to express condemnation of offenders—Boonin notes that even if pure restitution
is instituted, the state will still hold offenders legally responsible for their unlawful behavior.
As he notes, when currently the state acts to require restitution of an offender, “victims
typically see restitution as in part a symbolic statement about what happened to them”—the
statement being that the person “did something he had no right to do” Ibid., 268. Therefore,
there is no reason the system of pure restitution cannot express condemnation. The same is
true for punishment justified via the self-defense theory.
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